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Abstract:	 Thailand’s	 near-total	 elimination	 of	 opium	 poppy	 cultivation	 is	 attributed	 to	 “alternative	
development”	programming,	which	replaces	illicit	crops	with	licit	ones.	However,	opium	poppy	cultivation	
was	not	drastically	reduced	because	substitute	crops	earned	the	same	income	as	opium:	nothing	can	equal	
the	price	of	opium	 to	 smallholder	 farmers,	 especially	 those	without	 land	 tenure.	 Thailand’s	 reduction	 in	
poppy	 cultivation	 was	 achieved	 by	 the	 increased	 presence	 and	 surveillance	 capability	 of	 state	 security	
actors,	who,	 year	by	 year,	were	 able	 to	 locate	 and	destroy	 fields,	 and	 arrest	 cultivators,	with	 increasing	
accuracy.	This	coercion	was	also	accompanied	by	benefits	to	cultivators,	 including	the	provision	of	health	
and	education	services	and	the	extension	of	roads;	both	stick	and	carrot	constituted	the	encroachment	of	
the	Thai	 state.	The	provision	of	citizenship	 to	hill	 tribe	members	also	gave	 them	a	vested	 interest	 in	 the	
state,	 through	 their	 ability	 to	 hold	 land,	 access	 health	 care,	 education	 and	work	opportunities,	 amongst	
others.	These	initiatives	did	not	occur	without	costs	to	hill	tribe	cultures	for	whom	a	symbiotic	relationship	
with	 the	 land	 was	 and	 remains	 disrupted.	 These	 findings	 indicate	 that	 alternative	 development	










comparison	 to	 other	 drug-producing	 countries	 such	 as	 Afghanistan,	 Myanmar,	 Laos,	 Colombia,	
Peru,	 Bolivia	 and	 Mexico.	 The	 United	 Nations	 Office	 on	 Drugs	 and	 Crime	 (UNODC)	 declared	
Thailand	“opium	free”	a	decade	ago,	and	has	not	included	Thailand	in	its	World	Drugs	Report	since	
2008.	 Thailand	 is	 also	 widely	 heralded	 as	 a	 successful	 example	 of	 “alternative	 development”	
programming,	which	seeks	to	replace	illicit	crops	with	licit	ones,	and	which	is	conducted	in	tandem	
with	 coercive	 policies	 to	 eliminate	 the	 opium	 economy,	 comprised	 of	 poppy	 cultivation,	
refinement	into	opium,	conversion	to	heroin,	and	export.	
This	 paper	 analyses	 the	 historical	 success	 of	 alternative	 development	 in	 Northern	 Thailand	
and	 finds	 that	 opium	 poppy	 cultivation	 was	 not	 drastically	 reduced	 because	 substitute	 crops	
earned	the	same	income	as	opium:	nothing	can	equal	the	price	of	opium	to	smallholder	farmers,	
especially	those	without	land	tenure	and	the	consecutive	inability	to	securely	invest	in	longer-term	
crops.	Without	eradication,	opium	cultivation	 is	determined	by	market	 forces:	 in	1984,	 the	year	
eradication	began,	cultivation	was	again	peaking.	But	alternate	crops	did	provide	income,	aided	by	
a	market-distorting	price	 floor	 the	government	used	 to	make	up	 the	difference.	That	price	 floor	
remains.	The	near-total	 reduction	 in	opium	cultivation,	however,	was	aided	by	much	more	 than	
new	crops	and	price	guarantees.	The	era	of	eradication	was	heralded	by	the	increased	presence	of	
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state	 security	actors,	 enhanced	 law	enforcement	and	 surveillance,	 the	destruction	of	 crops,	 and	
the	arrest	of	cultivators.	But	this	coercion	was	also	accompanied	by	benefits	to	hill	tribes,	including	
the	 provision	 of	 health	 and	 education	 services,	 the	 extension	 of	 roads,	 the	 assignment	 of	 civil	
servants	to	administer	areas	they	were	previously	absent	from.	Both	stick	and	carrot	constituted	







was	 previously	 absent	 from.	 This	 paper	 therefore	 applies	 the	 theoretical	 frameworks	 of	 Van	
Schendel	(2002),	and	Scott	(2009)	toward	Thailand’s	contemporary	expansion	into	remote	areas	of	
Northwest	Thailand.	






representatives,	 security	 actors,	 academics,	 civil	 society	 representatives,	 local	 businesspersons,	
ex-cultivators,	 and	 recovering	 opium	 addicts	 in	 Omkoi,	 Chiang	 Mai,	 and	 other	 areas,	 from	


















producing	areas,	putting	 them	to	work	cultivating	monocrops	which	could	 then	be	 taken,	 taxed,	
and	 stored	 for	 long	 periods.	 In	 additional	 to	 monocropping,	 these	 lowland	 states	 were	
characterized	 by	 permanent	 settlements;	 uniformity	 of	 culture,	 language,	 and	 education;	 the	





first	 from	 the	 river	 valleys	 of	 central	 China,	 and	 then	 from	 Sichuan	 and	 Yunnan,	 as	 changing	
dynasties	seized	more	land	and	people.	Those	who	did	not	flee	eventually	became	Han.	Tai	people	
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originally	fled	Han	expansion,	but	they	replicated	Han	practices	in	the	lowlands	they	settled	in,	and	
eventually	 the	 most	 successful	 of	 the	 Tai	 statelets,	 Thailand,	 posed	 the	 same	 threat	 to	 other	
highlanders	that	Han	once	posed	to	them	as	they,	and	their	lowland	Bamar	neighbors,	encroached	
upon	 the	 hills.	 Highlanders	 fleeing	 an	 expanded	 state	 did	 not	 only	 constitute	 the	 constructed	
ethnicities	of	highland	populations;	they	were	also	constituted	by	select	Bamar,	Han,	Tai	and	other	
lowlanders	who	sought	freedom	in	the	forests	and	hills.	
The	 lowland	 Thai	 state	 grew	 from	 struggles	with	 Khmer	 and	 Bamar	 neighbors	 that	warred	
against	 one	 another	 in	 order	 to	 capture	 populations	 rather	 than	 territories.	 Thailand’s	 position	
between	 French	 and	 British	 colonies	 served	 as	 a	 buffer	 between	 the	 two	 and	 so	 the	 state	
consolidated	 internally,	 expanding	 rule	 into	 peripheral	 and	 highland	 areas	 not	 claimed	 by	
European	powers.	 	









Refugees	 entering	 highland	 southeast	 Asia	 in	 flight	 from	 Han	 Chinese	 expansion	 and	
successive	 failed	 rebellions	 likely	 brought	 opium	 poppy	 with	 them	 from	 Sichuan	 and	 Yunnan,	



















prices	was	 soon	 acted	 upon	 by	 traders,	 corrupt	 officials,	 and	 holders	 of	monopoly	 concessions.	
Highlanders	were	encouraged	to	plant	more	opium,	which	they	would	exchange	for	rice.	This	also	
occurred	in	China,	with	illicit	opium	cultivated	in	Yunnan	finding	its	way	into	the	Thai	drug	market.	
The	 British	 increased	 opium	 cultivation	 in	 Shan	 state,	 which	 borders	 NW	 Thailand,	 after	 they	
absorbed	Myanmar	into	India	in	three	stages	of	conquest.	 	
Opium	 cultivation	 in	 Thailand	 did	 not	 begin	 in	 earnest	 until	 the	 1940s.	 The	 fall	 of	 China’s	
Guomindang	(Kuomintang,	hereafter	KMT)	to	the	communists	in	1949	led	to	the	remnants	of	the																																																									
1	 Interviews,	 ONCB,	 Chian	 Mai	 &	 Omkoi,	 December	 2015/	 March	 2016.	 Many	 government	 interviewees	
regard	their	work	as	a	civilizing	mission.	
2	 Interviews,	villagers,	CRSPO,	ONCB,	Mae	Tuen/	Omkoi	town,	Omkoi,	March	2016.	
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KMT	fleeing	to	Myanmar,	where	they	expanded	cultivation	of	the	only	cash	crop	in	northern	Shan-	
opium,	which	would	 reach	 international	markets	 via	 Bangkok.	 Systematic	 cultivation	 percolated	
into	Thailand	with	highlanders	fleeing	KMT	conscription	and	taxation	(McCoy,	1973,	Lintner,	1999);	
Thailand’s	 hill	 tribes	 in	 remote	 areas	 became	 the	 primary	 cultivators	 of	 the	 crop,	 although	 the	
profit	 accrued	 elsewhere,	 with	 KMT	 and	 Chiu	 Chau3	 Chinese	 networks.	 Demand	 for	 Southeast	





Tribe	 swiddening	 (or	 pejoratively,	 “slash-and-burn”)	 agriculture	 (Thai:	 Rai	Mun	Wian;	 Burmese:	
Taungya),	 historically	 a	 sustainable	 farming	 practice	 practiced	 by	 highlanders,	mutated	 into	 the	
clearance	of	entire	hillsides	for	poppy	in	Shan	and	northwest	Thailand.	Thai	communist	insurgents	
also	 profited	 from	 this	 trade;	 highlanders	 were	 their	 farmers	 and	 foot	 soldiers.	 Opium	 became	
central	to	the	dominant	lowland	Thai	discourse	on	hill	tribes.	It	was	in	this	era	especially	that,	for	
many	 lowland	 Thai,	 highlanders—swiddeners,	 opium	 growers,	 traffickers,	 rebels—became	
associated	with	 environmental	 destruction,	 crime,	 and	 threat.	 These	 stereotypes,	 which	 do	 not	





which	 was	 partly	 fueled	 by	 addicted	 American	 soldiers	 returning	 from	 Vietnam.	 The	 Thai	
government,	 with	 US	 pressure	 and	 funding,	 began	 treating	 opium	 as	 an	 illegal	 substance	 and	
poppy	 as	 an	 illegal	 crop.	 Elements	 of	 the	 Thai	 state	 once	 involved	 in	 cultivation	 and	 trafficking	
began	their	own	disentanglement	at	this	time.	The	government	increased	the	scale	of	alternative	
livelihoods	 programs	 which	 had	 initially	 begun	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 Thai	 King	 Bhumibol	
Adulyadej’s	 Royal	 Project	 (est.	 1969).	 The	 Royal	 Project’s	 approach	 to	 alternative	 livelihoods	
included:	 	








Government	 soon	 created	 a	 specialized	 agency,	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 Narcotics	 Control	 Board	
(hereafter	 ONCB),	 to	 oversee	 Thailand’s	 drug	 control	 policy,	 alternative	 livelihoods	 and	 (later)	
eradication	in	particular.	In	line	with	the	implicit	mission	of	alternative	development	as	an	exercise	
in	 the	 consolidation	 of	 state	 power	 and	 the	 weakening	 of	 threats	 to	 the	 state,	 the	 ONCB	
established	its	first	five	regional	offices	in	Communist	Party	of	Thailand	(CPT)	insurgent	strongholds	
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soon	 crashed,	 and	 chemicals	 were	 soon	 banned	 due	 to	 the	 contamination	 of	 water	 sources	 in	
watershed	 areas.	 The	 same	happened	with	 tomatoes;	 these	 initial	 failures	 caused	many	 former	
opium	cultivators	to	abandon	the	project5.	
The	 government	 established	 price	 floors	 for	 alternative	 crops	 and	 became	 the	 guaranteed	
buyer	 for	 Royal	 Project	 produce,	 in	 order	 to	match	 the	 price	 farmers	 once	 earned	 from	 opium	
poppy	 cultivation.	 The	 Royal	 Project	 initially	 focused	 on	 monocropping,	 which	 served	 to	 make	
highland	participants	more	reliant	on	the	cash	which	their	monocrop	could	earn,	which	they	could	
then	 use	 for	 further	 nutritional	 diversification.	 This	 was	 an	 aspect	 of	 lowland	 “best	 practices”	






the	 3rd	 Army.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	 crops,	 authorities	 began	 actively	 arresting	
cultivators.	 Between	 1984	 and	 1985,	 Thailand’s	 area	 under	 cultivation	 dropped	 from	 8,290	 to	
2,428	Ha	 (Renard,	 2001),	 and	accordingly	 rose	 in	Myanmar7,	where	 the	opium	harvest,	 from	an	
average	 of	 300-400,000	 KG	 per	 year,	 would	 peak	 at	 1,500,000	 KG	 in	 the	 mid-1990s;	 this	 peak	




Cultivation	 persisted,	 however,	 in	 remote	 areas	 which	 the	 state	 had	 difficulty	 accessing	 or	
maintaining	a	presence	in.	The	evasion	strategies	cultivators	developed	resulted	in	staggered	crops	
which	sprouted	on	those	same	plots	destroyed	by	the	army,	weeks	after	they	departed.	A	poppy	
growth	 cycle	 is	 roughly	 3	 months,	 but	 the	 annual	 opium-planting	 season	 is	 8	 months;	 several	
overlapping	planting	cycles	occurred.	New	poppy	fields	were	established	further	from	settlements;	




Harm	Reduction	was	 also	 a	 late	 addition	 to	 Thailand’s	 drug	 control	 policy.	 Thailand’s	 initial	
response	to	its	multifaceted	drug	problem	was	driven	by	foreign,	primarily	American,	concerns.	As	
the	 problem	 was	 considered	 international	 and	 not	 local,	 the	 Thai	 government’s	 approach	
concentrated	 only	 on	 the	 elimination	 of	 supply.	 Only	 in	 the	 1990s	 did	 Thai	 drug	 control	 policy	
begin	to	address	issues	of	local	addiction,	firstly	of	heroin	(which	for	a	brief	period	in	the	1980s	and	










pressure	on	Myanmar’s	 State	 Law	and	Order	Restoration	Council	 to	 crack	down	on	heroin-manufacturing	
insurgents,	most	 notably	 Khun	 Sa’s	Mong	 Tai	 Army.	 The	world	 epicenter	 of	 poppy	 cultivation	 and	 heroin	
manufacture	 soon	 shifted	 to	 Afghanistan,	 where	 the	Mujahideen	 group	 Hizb	 e	 Islami	 began	 synthesizing	
heroin	in	Helmand	after	the	Soviet	withdrawal	in	1989.	The	Taliban’s	declaration	of	heroin	manufacture	as	
haram	or	forbidden	in	the	late	1990s	caused	cultivation	to	shift	back	to	Myanmar.	







The	 experience	 of	 Doi	 Laan	 is	 emblematic	 of	 the	 wider	 disruption	 in	 cultures	 and	 economies	
caused	by	alternative	development	and	eradication.	Doi	Lann	is	a	Lisu	village	in	Chiangrai	province.	




their	 crops	 were	 torched.	 The	 Royal	 Project	 and	 a	 German	 bilateral	 development	 project	
introduced	tomatoes	and	cabbages	but	the	Lisu	quickly	fell	under	the	sway	of	lowlanders	who	paid	
below-market	prices	and	then	cashed	in	on	the	guaranteed	price	floor	paid	by	the	Royal	Project.	





in	 income	 from	 alternative	 crops	 affected	 their	 status.	 Doi	 Laan’s	 men	 became	 unhinged	 as	
household	 incomes	 plummeted.	 Alcoholism	 increased,	 as	 did	 use	 of	 heroin,	 amphetamine-like	
stimulants	(ALS),	and	prostitution;	injection	and	prostitution	heralded	an	HIV	epidemic	that	swept	






The	 success	of	 the	overall	 alternative	 livelihoods	and	crop	 substitution	program	 in	Thailand	





different	 from	 what	 the	 state	 intends;	 contestations	 over	 resources	 are	 implicit	 challenges	 to	
legitimacy.	 The	 state’s	 bureaucracy	 and	 coercive	 authority	 led	 to	 changes	 more	 than	 any	 new	
crops—none	of	which	provided	the	same	level	of	income	that	opium	poppy	cultivation	did.	But	the	















issue:	 it	 is	 an	 ideal	 alternate	 crop.	 But	 Arabica	 takes	 at	 least	 3	 years	 to	 reach	 maturity	 for	
harvesting.	Providing	 this	 tenure	 to	 farmers	encouraged	 them	 to	 shift	 away	 from	an	 illegal	 crop	
with	a	short	cultivation	window	and	a	high	rate	of	return	by	giving	them	the	security	of	knowing	
they	would	not	be	expelled	from	the	land	they	cultivated.	In	areas	designated	as	protected	by	the	
Royal	 Forestry	 Department	 (see	 below),	 limited	 tenure	was	 also	 allowed,	 sometimes	 grudgingly	
(Renard,	2001).	Citizenship	gives	 those	who	hold	 it	 a	 vested	 interest	 in	 the	 state	and	 its	 laws;	 it	
provides	minimum	levels	of	security	and	protection,	even	in	areas	where	the	rule	of	law	is	still	in	
adaptive	 phases.	 In	 Thailand’s	 evolving	 state-citizen	 compact,	 it	 provides	 free	 education	 and	
subsidized	 health	 care.	 It	 allows	 ownership	 of	 land	 and	 access	 to	 credit,	 and	 is	 necessary	 for	
longer-term	investments.	The	further	one	enters	remaining	contemporary	opium	cultivation	areas	
(such	as	Omkoi-	see	below),	the	larger	the	percentage	of	the	population	lacks	it.	 	
Roads	 and	 electricity:	 The	 impact	 of	 crop	 substitution	 cannot	 be	 disentangled	 from	 other	




static	 agriculture	 and	 livestock,	 was	 antithetical	 to	 highland	 swiddening	 traditions:	 while	
alternative	 development	 was	 primarily	 concerned	 with	 opium	 poppy,	 it	 implicitly	 targeted	
swiddening	 as	 well.	 Alternative	 development	 projects	 largely	 ended	 the	 symbiotic	 relationship	
between	hill	tribe	swiddeners	and	forests.	And	in	the	areas	it	was	successful,	it	changed	the	very	
reason	why	highlanders	cultivated	crops:	from	household	unit	consumption	to	sale	in	markets.	 	
The	Royal	Forestry	Department	was	 initially	created	 to	protect	and	 regulate	Thailand’s	 teak	
supply	 in	 the	 late	1800s,	after	highland	Karen	began	“illegally”	selling	teak	to	the	British	 in	Shan	
and	the	French	in	Laos.	At	that	time	all	forests	were	declared	the	property	of	the	state.	Ironically,	
RFD	 can	be	historically	 implicated	 in	 the	 introduction	of	opium	 to	Karen	 in	Nong	Tao	and	other	
areas	of	Chiang	Mai:	they	banned	Karen	from	growing	rice,	which	would	have	required	large-scale	




2011).	 RFD’s	 policing	 of	 forest	 subcontracted	 Thai	 demand	 for	 forest	 products	 into	 Myanmar	
(Smith,	1994),	Karen	National	Union	areas	in	particular11.	Since	its	inception,	the	RFD	has	been	at	
loggerheads	 with	 hill	 tribes,	 denouncing	 and	 seeking	 to	 end	 swiddening,	 which	 it	 and	 other	
agencies	uniformly	oppose	under	the	mistaken	impression	that	it	 is	environmentally	harmful	and	
leads	to	large-scale	deforestation,	while	all	available	studies	demonstrate	that	it	is	a	rejuvenating	
practice12	 (Asia	 Indigenous	People’s	Alliance,	2012;	Bruun	et	al.,	2009;	Erni,	2009;	 Laungaramsri,	
2005).	 Karen	 leader	 Phaw	 Luang	 Jorni	 Odochao	 notes	 a	 particular	 irony:	 “The	 Thai	 government	
blames	us	 for	deforestation.	But	where	Karen	 live,	 there	are	 forests;	where	Thais	 live,	 there	are	
none."	Further,	 the	wholesale	 land	clearances	by	KMT,	Hmong,	Lisu	and	others	 in	 the	heyday	of	
opium	cultivation	was	not	 swiddening,	but	 for	many	 lowlanders,	 the	practices	were	one	and	the	
same.	While	opium	cultivation	declined,	so	did	swiddening.																																																									














only	 lately	declared	 reserved	because	of	 some	 lines	drawn	on	paper.	 The	problem	occurs	when	
those	boundaries	are	drawn,	causing	the	people	inhabiting	those	areas	to	become	“lawbreakers”.	





remove	Karen,	Hmong,	Lisu	and	others	 from	 lands	 they	have	dwelt	 in	 for	centuries.	The	current	
Thai	junta,	the	National	Council	for	Peace	and	Order	(NCPO),	issued	order	64/2014	to	protect	and	






opposite	 of	 claims	 made	 by	 alternative	 development	 practitioners14	 who	 assert	 that	 the	 cash	
earned	 from	 monocropping	 allows	 for	 the	 purchase	 of	 varied	 foodstuffs	 which	 were	 once	
cultivated.	 The	market	price	of	 a	monocrop,	however,	 is	 volatile,	 especially	 for	high-value	 crops	
such	as	coffee,	and	so	a	collapse	in	its	price	signifies	a	collapse	in	household	purchasing	power,	and	
therefore,	 a	 collapse	 in	 the	 collapse	 of	 a	 food	 supply	 which	 was	 previously	 a	 constant.	 This	
reduction	in	food	security	is	not	quantitatively	measureable	due	to	a	lack	of	preserved	data	from	
past	 projects	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 previous	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation,	 but	 Karen	 and	 other	 hill	 tribe	
interviewees	who	experienced	this	attested	to	it.	 	
Increasing	 dependence	 on	markets	 and	 out-migration:	 The	 reduction	 in	 swiddening	 further	
integrated	highland	cultivators	into	Thailand’s	“cash”	(non-opium)	economy,	thus	increasing	their	
dependence	on	the	state	and	its	markets,	and	necessitating	non-traditional	forms	of	work	paid	in	
currency.	 This	 integration	 also	 encouraged	 seasonal	 and	 sometimes	 permanent	 migration	 of	
highlanders	 to	 towns	and	cities,	often	 for	construction	and	other	casual	 labor:	 in	many	highland	
areas,	 remittances	 became	 the	 primary	 income	 streams	 for	 cash-based	 needs.	 Select	 Chiangrai	
activists	make	a	connection	between	declining	opium	cultivation	and	increasing	trafficking	in	tribal	
women	to	brothels	in	the	south,	but	this	is	anecdotal.	




to	 Lisu	 life,	Hutheesing	 (ibid.)	and	others	note15,	 and	 the	enforced	absence	of	 it	 resulted	 in	high	
rates	 of	 infidelity,	 alcoholism,	 amphetamine	 and	 heroin	 abuse,	 with	 resultant	 increasing	 HIV	
transmission	in	Lisu	villages.	 	
Other	 Impacts:	Hill	 tribes	 saw	alternative	development	as	 an	 imposition	 from	Bangkok	 that	
stripped	them	of	their	culture	and	sought	to	turn	them	into	caricatures	of	lowland	Thais	(Jantakad	
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voices	played	no	 role	 in	 the	 shaping	of	 them;	nor	did	 they	 choose	which	new	 crops	 they	might	
cultivate.	 	








state	 of	 hegemonic	 power	 relations	 (Siriphon,	 2001)	 between	 lowland	 and	 highland,	 shifting	
inexorably	in	favor	of	the	lowlands	by	the	lever	of	alternative	development.	




While	opium	poppy	 cultivation	declined	 significantly,	 it	did	not	end.	The	majority	of	 known	
opium	 cultivation	 in	 contemporary	 Thailand	 occurs	 in	 Chiang	 Mai’s	 Omkoi	 district:	 an	 area	
bypassed	by	a	half	 century	of	 alternative	development	and	eradication,	 although	 residents	note	
that	 opium	was	 cultivated	 there	 since	 at	 least	 the	 1960s.	 ONCB	 recorded	 significant	 cultivation	
increases	 in	 the	 1990s,	 but	 inexplicably	 stopped	 monitoring	 the	 district	 around	 1998,	 only	









field	 research	 demonstrates	 that,	 not	 only	 are	 Karen	 growing	 opium	 now,	 but	 they	 have	 been	
growing	in	Omkoi	and	other	areas	of	Chiang	Mai	for	at	least	50	years.	While	most	Karen	no	longer	
engage	 in	 cultivation	 or	 consumption,	 in	 remoter	 parts	 of	 Omkoi	 their	 cultivation	 rates	 are	 the	
highest	 in	 Thailand.	 Thai	 and	 US	 drug	 control	 efforts	 historically	 overlooked	 this	 district,	 and	
possibly	others	hosting	drug	production	not	yet	identified	by	the	state,	because	it	did	not	host	an	
interrelated	 communist	 insurgency,	 nor	 were	 cultivation	 rates	 as	 high	 as	 other	 areas	 of	 NW	
Thailand.	The	government	has	recognized	the	scale	of	cultivation	and	since	2009	has	taken	a	novel	
“network	 governance”	 approach	 to	 suppression	 (Jongruck,	 2012),	 utilizing	 lessons	 from	 former	
cultivation	areas	(Anderson	et	al,	2-15)	
Opium’s	profit	hardly	accrues	 to	 the	 farmer.	Omkoi’s	Karen	grow	opium	because	 they	have	
little	other	choice.	The	encroachment	of	“development”	upon	Omkoi’s	Karen	has	already	occurred	
through	their	growing	reliance	on	lowland	markets	where	currency	is	the	only	form	of	exchange,	
and	opium	 is	 the	highest-	value	cash	crop	around.	Their	 lack	of	citizenship	precludes	 them	from	
land	 tenure	which	might	 incentive	 them	 to	grow	estate	 crops	with	a	 lower	 rate	of	 return	and	a	
longer	 cultivation	 period,	 and	 their	 statelessness	 also	 precludes	 them	 from	 services,	 credit	 and	
other	protections.	Even	if	they	had	citizenship,	their	presence	in	a	C-Zone	reserve	area	still	leaves	
them	“illegal”.	And	if	these	issues	are	all	overcome,	a	stark	truth	remains:	there	is	no	alternative	
crop	 that	 can	 equal	 the	 price	 a	 farmer	 earns	 from	 opium.	 Previous	 programs	 did	 not	 succeed	
because	of	agriculture,	but	because	of	the	increased	presence	of	the	state.	
That	 presence,	 however,	 is	 growing,	 most	 palpably	 in	 eradication,	 law	 enforcement,	 and	
market	 encroachment.	 Omkoi	 is	 1960s	 highland	 Thailand	 in	 microcosm;	 it	 hosts	 the	 historical	









brought	 peace	 to	 a	 State	 of	 Nature,	 but	 because	 they	 were	 logistically	 more	 effective	 and	
coercively	more	 brutal	 than	 competing	 entities	 when	 it	 came	 to	 waging	 war,	 holding	 territory,	
mobilizing	labor/	conscription,	and	levying	‘tax’	(Tilly,	1985):	they	held	‘a	decisive	advantage	in	the	
power	 to	 kill”	 (Landes,	 1998:	 88).	 Over	 time,	 firstly	 in	 Europe,	 and	 later,	 in	 the	 colonies,	 these	
exploitative	entities	developed	beyond	their	solely	violent	and	coercive	beginnings;	they	became	
‘legitimate’	by	providing	protection	not	just	from	themselves,	but	also	from	others,	and	they	began	
to	 provide	 services16:	 transportation	 and	 communications	 infrastructure,	 health	 and	 education,	







Ethnic	 identities	 have	 always	 been	 in	 flux;	 globalization	 increases	 this	 process.	 Highlanders	 are	
drawn	to	the	state,	and	absorbed	into	its	cash	economy:	they	need	the	tools	that	will	help	them	
better	 navigate	 it.	 These	 tools	 did	 not	 prevent	 highlanders	 from	 becoming	more	 Thai	 and	 less	
Akha,	Karen,	Hmong	or	Lisu;	as	traditional	 lifestyles	change,	painful	decisions	must	be	made,	but	
education,	citizenship,	and	market	skills	were	all	tools	which	highlanders	could	use	to	play	more	of	
a	 part	 in	 those	decisions,	 rather	 than	 simply	have	decisions	made	on	 their	 behalf,	 by	 their	 own	
leaders	or	by	the	state.	Development,	in	this	case,	was	self-defense.	
The	Thai	state	eliminated	its	position	as	a	source	of	opium	for	international	illicit	drug	markets	
decades	 ago.	 That	 success	 occurred	 with	 a	 great	 cultural	 cost	 to	 the	 hill	 tribes:	 the	 symbiotic	
relationship	 between	 people	 and	 land	 ended.	 This	 was,	 and	 remains,	 traumatic.	 Eradication	
worked	 due	 not	 only	 to	 eradication,	 arrests,	 and	 crop	 substitution;	 it	 worked	 because	 the	
imposition	 of	 law	 occurred	 consecutive	 with	 benefits	 to	 hill	 tribes	 such	 as	 the	 provision	 of	
citizenship	and	 the	 rights	and	 responsibilities	 it	embodies;	 the	end	of	 inaccessibility	 through	 the	
establishment	 of	 roads;	 increased	 access	 to	 schools	 and	 health	 care;	 access	 to	markets	 and	 to	
credit,	and	all	manner	of	other	services	and	obligations	that,	together,	constitute	an	ever-evolving	
social	contract.	




of	 states	was	 expanded	 across	 the	 globe,	with	 all	 ‘primitive’	 people	 imagined	 to	 voluntarily	 surrender	 to	
nearby	states	in	order	to	gain	the	peace	and	protection	these	entities	offered.	Whilst	these	claims	may	have	
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